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3EVOLVING TOWARD PRODUCT AND MARKET-ORIENTATION:
THE EARLY YEARS OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED FIRMS
ABSTRACT
Research studies of 114 technology-based firms within the Greater
Boston area indicate evolution over the first several years after
founding toward: (a) more product-oriented businesses, away from
consulting and R&D contracting; and (b) increased orientation of the
founders to sales and marketing, with lessened emphasis on engineering.
Evolution toward market-orientation is manifested in many ways. The
use of direct sales forces as well as sales representatives both grow
over time, as does the adoption of more formal mechanisms such as
marketing departments, sales forecasting and analyses of potential
markets. Greater orientation toward marketing in all its dimensions is
especially true for multi-founder firms, the single founder company
being slower to evolve in the characteristics cited.
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4EVOLVING TOWARD PRODUCT AND MARKET-ORIENTATION:
THE EARLY YEARS OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED FIRMS
People, technology and/or an idea for a product or service, and money
enable a technical enterprise to get formally initiated. But what do the
founders do in getting underway? And how do their companies change during
the first several years of existence? While research on technology-based
enterprises has increased significantly, especially in recent years, most
studies (not cited here) have focused upon characteristics of the
entrepreneurs, the venture capital financing of these firms, some elements of
their strategies, or their overall success and failure. Few research projects
have focused upon aspects of change during the early life of these new
technology-based firms. Yet it is safe to assume that evolution of both the
founders and their firms may be necessary for companies to benefit from
experiential learning and to adapt to environmental changes in technologies
and markets. This article seeks to add empirically to the evidences of change
during the early years of technology-based companies. How much occurs and
in what ways? Can prospective entrepreneurs learn from their predecessors
any clues for more effective launch and development of their companies?
THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Researchers have long been interested in how and why organizations
change over their life cycles of birth, growth, maturation and death. And yet,
in their synopsis volume, The Organizational Life Cycle, Kimberly & Miles [9]
decry the absence of "the dynamic quality of organizational life ... from most
research and writing in the area." (p. 3) Quinn & Cameron [11] hypothesize
four distinct phases, beginning with "an entrepreneurial stage characterized
by innovation, creativity, and the marshalling of resources sufficient to
survive." In an excellent identification of eighteen alternative "stage models"
to depict the evolution of complex phenomena, especially in organization and
management theory, Kazanjian [7] provides further specifications that should
facilitate concrete empirical research. Two studies that postulate
organizational life cycle theories of the firm have attempted to relate
psychological characteristics of entrepreneurs to the adaptation needed
during a firm's transition, but neither study examined technological
companies. [4,17] Only the few works cited below have been found that
5applied these models toward data collection on technical firms.
Van de Ven [21] classifies the research on the creation of organizations
into entrepreneurial (focusing upon personal characteristics of founders),
ecological (focusing upon shifts in organization populations and their
reasons), and organizational (focusing upon managerial processes involved in
initiation and early development). Our research presented in this paper clearly
falls into the last category. Van de Ven's study of 12 educational software
companies, treating all three research dimensions, identifies five stages in
the development of these technical firms, of which two stages, gestation and
planning, occur prior to actual company operation. On a number of dimensions
Van de Ven documents major differences (few unfortunately of statistical
significance due to small sample size) between the firms classified as in
their early poststartup stages and those in later stages. A critical
organizational finding is that mean percentile time allocation of principals to
working on products decreases from 26.6% in early stage companies to 21.1%
in later stage firms, while time spent on customer contacts increases from
34.1% to 48.6%. (p. 98)
Robinson & Pearce [16] investigated the shifts in company strategy as a
function of the life-cycle stage of its products for 77 small North Carolina
manufacturing firms; they found little significant differences among the
relative importance of ten factors affecting strategic management as the
stage of the product life cycle changes. Rather consistent with Van de Ven's
findings above, they did find a strong decline, as products evolved from
development toward maturity, in CEO concerns for: changes in process design;
changes in product design; risk of producing the product; and emphasis on
creativity. All these shifts contribute to diminished focus on technical
issues as products evolve. However, Robinson & Pearce did not have
complementary information available in regard to changes in concerns for
market-related factors. Tushman & Romanelli [19] have traced the more
dramatic changes that occur over the longer-term growth of companies from
their emergence to maturity. Neither study looks at the early perhaps more
modest changes that occur immediately post-formation, as the primarily
technically-trained entrepreneurs begin to operate the companies they have
founded. In contrast Teach, Tarpley, Schwartz, & Brawley [18] have recently
examined the changes in key actors during early evolution of software
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companies. "While only 12.5% of the original founders came from the
marketing area, almost double that, 23.5% of the new principals came from a
marketing position... This shift was compensated in a large part by the almost
disappearance of "R&D" as a source of new principals." (pp. 467-468)
In their recent paper Kazanjian & Drazin 8] present and test a model of
technology-based firms, "postulated to evolve through four discrete stages of
growth -- Conception and Development, Commercialization, Growth, and
Stability". (p. 1489) Tracing 71 companies with tangible products over an 18
months period, they found that 28 ventures advanced and 14 regressed one or
more stages during this relatively short period of observation, providing
partial support for their model. The dominant problems faced by management
change significantly as the high-tech firms proceed through the four stages.
Research Hypotheses
Inferences from the systematic research cited, supported by intuition,
personal experience, and anecdotal testimony from the likes of Inc. and
Venture magazines, provide the bases for general hypothesis formation in this
area of still essentially unplowed ground. Technical companies are founded
primarily on the basis of some technological advance, rather than on the
presumption of competitive advantage in regard to marketing, sales or
distribution. [13] The founders are for the most part engineers, with some
marketing/sales and business experience present in the multi-founder teams.
[5, 6, 12] Not all technical entrepreneurs have unique ideas and high need for
achievement; some of them are initially merely fleeing dissatisfaction with a
prior job or are pursuing independence, without specific ideas for product or
market. [3] Consequently, reasonable general hypotheses might include:
(a) Technology-based firms are initially divided between the intended
sale of manufactured products (and/or repetitive services) and the
intended performance of technical consulting and contractual
development work, with evolution occurring toward more product focus;
(b) Their founders are initially primary oriented toward engineering and
technology, not sales and marketing, with evolution toward marketing
occurring over time, if the firm survives; and
7(c) The multi-founder firm shows a greater tendency toward both
product and sales/marketing orientation initially, and also evolves
more rapidly in both areas, than the single founder company.
No basis exists for specifying these hypotheses in greater detail. The
research presented in this paper is clearly exploratory in this regard.
However, the author perceives tat technology-based enterprises might
be seen as falling into an evolutionary process such as that shown in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In this hypothesized model the only solid forces that necessarily precede the
Founding of a Technology-Based Company are shown as a set of
Entrepreneurial Drives and Technical Capabilities. Although the author
believes it is desirable for the founders also to have both a Product Idea and a
Market Orientation even at the outset of their firm, the above hypotheses
suggest that many companies are started without these presumed assets.
Indeed, both a Product Idea and a Market Orientation might strengthen latent
Entrepreneurial Drives (arrows not shown in Figure 1 for simplicity) and
actually lead to company initiation through their impact upon entrepreneurial
behavior. Effective Product Development, if it is to occur, obviously demands
both a Product Idea and Technical Capabilities. The broad research literature
on the importance of marketing inputs to product success [see 20 for review]
supports the assumption that Effective Market-Related Activities are also
essential to Effective Product Development (also omitted from Figure 1 for
simplicity). Furthermore, while the author also believes that Effective
Product Development and Market-Related Activities are critical to achieving
a high rate of Company Growth and eventual Company Success, the above
hypotheses again suggest that some companies never evolve in this manner.
Their Company Growth is thus stymied by lack of products and/or market
perspectives. The Figure 1 model thus presents alternative paths toward
eventual success of the technology-based firm, paths that might never be
taken due to lack of company evolution toward product and
market-orientation. Omitted from this partial model of technology-based
company founding, growth and success are numerous other potentially
8important influences, including capital and other resources, environmental
influences, and strategic factors. But even in its simplified form the model
conveys the potential role of product and market-orientation in affecting a
firm's development. Explicit support for the relationships between these
hypothesized organizational changes and later corporate success will have to
await a later stage of our own research life cycle [see 15].
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
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The data analyzed here in order to test the rough hypotheses presented
above come from: (a) a general analysis of the formation and growth of
high-technology new enterprises, part of a broader twenty years research
program on entrepreneurship; and (b) a special analysis of time allocation of
founding team members of high technology firms during their early years.
The overall data set used for this c rticle is assembled from information
collected from five organizations (shown in Table 1), that are the sources of
one hundred and twenty-five firms founded by former employees of the major
laboratories and engineering departments of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT).
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Beginning with strong cooperation of senior managers in each of these
five MIT source organizations, initial lists were developed of people who
were thought to have spunoff new enterprises from that organization.
Follow-up interviews were used to generate further suggestions in a
"snowball" sample creation process as well as to screen the initial lists for
errors. Rigorous criteria were applied to include only those who had been
former full-time employees of the source organizations, who later
participated as founders of wholly-new for-profit companies. (As very few
female entrepreneurs were found in these samples of technical entrepreneurs,
the male pronoun is used in the remainder of this article in referring to the
entrepreneurs.)
Structured interviews with a detailed questionnaire, lasting typically
one to two and one-half hours, were used to gather data from each founding
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9entrepreneur personally, with telephone interviews used in less than ten
percent of the cases and mailed interview responses used only as a last
resort in less than one percent of the cases. Some interviews stretched to
seven or eight hours over two or three sessions. Despite extensive efforts to
include all spin-offs from each source organization studied, no doubt some
minor bias has crept into the sample of companies studied in that it is likely
that any companies not located were less successful than those traced. The
bias did not prevent many companies from being found and studied that were
clearly failures or not very successful. However, in the absence of attempts
to measure and then link performance to company characteristics in this
study, we can only provide warnings that lower performing companies may be
underrepresented. The high participation rate in the data collection of 91
percent of those firms identified provides some assurance of
representativeness within the MIT "spinoffs", but no follow-up analysis was
made to test for bias among the few non-participants. Data were collected
from the participants in regard to their initial conditions at the time of
company formation as well as conditions at the time of the data gathering, on
average five to seven years post-founding.
Within this overall sample, a special sub-sample was generated in order
to gather more detailed information about founder time allocation and
company change over the first two years of new enterprise operations. To
assure reliable data recall on the first years of existence the original group
of 96 MIT laboratory spinoff companies was screened to exclude those
companies over five years old at the time of data collection. Limiting the
sample further to be within the Greater Boston area for ease of data
gathering, and omitting the high outliers in regard to size of initial
capitalization to assure more comparability, twenty prospects were
identified. Eighteen of the twenty companies (90%) agreed to cooperate with
a more probing set of structured interviews using a detailed questionnaire
that covered the first two years of company activities. The resulting small
group constitutes 16% of the larger overall sample described above. The
research design thus provides a form of longitudinal study, with data
gathered for three time periods in the lives of the participating companies:
founding, two years, and five to seven years.
Answers to all of the detailed questionnaires led easily to the
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quantification of information. Most of the answers were coded and arranged
in computer data files. Incomplete information on some of the companies
does not particularly affect the data analysis as relevant codes were given to
isolate missing information.
Naturally no claim of generality to the population of technological
enterprises throughout the United States (or abroad) can be made from the
primary data and their analyses, drawn as they are entirely from companies
founded by former employees of major-MIT laboratories and departments. But,
as will be shown, the results are at least supported in general by other
studies cited in this article of firms originating from non-academic source
organizations in the Greater Boston area. Research on the evolution over time
of new technology-based enterprises formed in other parts of the United
States and abroad would provide welcome comparisons.
MACROSCOPIC CHANGE: THE FIRMS' FOCUS
Data from the overall sample provide insights into changes in the
general focus and direction of the companies, in terms of what businesses
they were in and their primary activities in achieving business objectives.
Initial Type of Business
The structured interviews we conducted demonstrated that many of the
entrepreneurial founders were unclear when they started their companies as
to who would become the initial customers for their products or services;
some were not even sure as to exactly what their companies would be doing.
A number of the entrepreneurs, especially among the sole founders, might be
regarded as rather flexible! In many cases the founders hoped to do some
consulting or contract research and development and, while living on the
income from this work, planned to develop a product or find a product that
they could exploit. It should not be surprising then to find a great number of
the firms engaging in consulting and R&D work at the beginning, as the
Beginning Totals row of Table 2 indicates. Forty-one of the 109 companies
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
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listed (or 38%) were solely engaged in consulting or R&D contracted to
government agencies or to larger industrial firms. It is difficult to define
the difference between these two categories of business, as various
"consultants" described their work as including analytical work, designing or
developing a special system for a customer, or solving a particular technical
problem for a customer, usually for an industrial client. Conceivably other
entrepreneurs might have categorized the same work as being "contract R&D".
The remaining 68 of the 109 firms (62%) were producing or refining for
production software and hardware products, including 24 that were producing
while concurrently carrying out contractual R&D work.
About one-third of the producers began as "job shops", making limited
numbers of products to special orders; the others had proprietary products
from the outset or under development. Occasionally this is a fine distinction,
because some of the "standard" products of a technology-based firm are
expensive machines or instruments with high unit cost (several thousand
dollars each), that are adapted individually to each customer's requirements.
Nevertheless the underlying product is the same in these cases.
As partial confirmation of the first hypothesis, note that only
somewhat more than a majority of the technology-based firms in our sample
began with a product focus. In a separate unpublished study performed by the
author, 23 companies that had emerged from a large diversified technological
firm, 61% started out with production focus, often also in conjunction with
providing R&D services. More severe are the results from Olofsson et al.'s
research on young technically-based companies originating from seven
Swedish universities. [10] Half of the 90 "significant companies" in the
Swedish data primarily carry out contract development work for customers;
30% do mostly consulting; and only ten to twenty percent have their own
products as their main line of operation. Presumably even fewer of the "less
significant" Swedish spin-off firms have a product focus.
Changes in Type of Business
The overall data enabled reexamination of the state of the companies at
a time when they averaged five to seven years old. By this point in time these
firms have certainly evolved from their initial condition and some have
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already demonstrated important growth and success. Other companies, while
evolved and perhaps more stable, are less impressive in their achievements,
except perhaps for their survival to date. The companies will continue to
change and grow past this point of assessment, and our later research
analyses attempt to distinguish those influences that affect corporate
success and failure. [15]
Table 2 also presents information on the later (average age, 5 to 7
years) type of business activities for th6 overall sample. Underlying these
numbers is a basic change in the nature of work done within the firms. For
example, when operations began for these new firms only 57 out of 109 (52%)
of the enterprises possessed (or were developing) a hardware product. By the
point in time several years later, documented here in the Later Totals column,
78 (or 72%) of the firms have at least one hardware product that has been
marketed. In most cases the products were continuations and evolutions of
their startup activities, including for some bringing to fruition the product
development efforts that were initially underway but not yet completed. For
other firms products resulted as an indirect (and sometimes unintended)
consequence of contract R&D or consulting efforts carried out for
governmental or industrial customers. One company, for example, became a
major supplier of industrial electronic security systems as a result of
bootlegged internal efforts by technical staff who had been working on
somewhat related military contract developments.
In other instances the development of a product was the result of a
conscious decision to change the character of a firm. This was especially
true for several firms that had initially been engaged solely in contractual
development work. Although this work often provided a stable source of
entrepreneurial income, a number of the founders of these firms realized that
far greater profit margins and better opportunities for corporate growth
existed in the sale of products. These companies set about deliberately to
develop products or to acquire ongoing firms with products that might
complement their R&D service work. A few companies moved in the opposite
direction, supplementing their product sales with contractual R&D work,
occasionally with the intent of using these funds and exposures to develop
still further products.
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The hierarchy of type of business preferred by the technical firms is
suggested by the changes shown in Table 2, which presents a scattergram of
the firms' beginning and later functions. Only 8 of the 20 original consultants
are still doing that kind of business; no firms in this particular sample
shifted over time into consulting work. Firms originally doing just contract
R&D (21 of the 109) remained intact, added production efforts to their R&D,
or evolved into production alone. When shifts occurred for companies that
were initially in both production and contract R&D, they were either to a more
encompassing scope of those initial activities or into hardware production
only. In the cases where initial producers evolved it was only to add contract
R&D to their work mix.
Despite the changes in product status and manufacturing orientation
described, the figures in Table 2 present a relative lack of change for most of
the firms in their overall types of business being pursued. The bold numbers
along the principal diagonal, when compared with their column totals, reflect
this constancy. Except for those firms initially engaged in consulting or in
contract research and development alone, only fourteen companies out of 68,
the off-diagonal firms (21%), deviated from the type of work they had
initially undertaken. And in ten of those fourteen the change was to add other
types of work to their original activities, five of them adding software
production. Three of the four firms which reduced their scope of work went
from hardware production plus contract R&D to hardware production only. The
companies as a whole have clearly evolved toward more general business
operations as firms engaged in heir own product development, manufacture
and sales, moving from 62% initially engaged in production of some form to
84%.
In confirmation of the first hypothesis, note that the sample has indeed
evolved more toward a product focus. But also recognize that 16 percent of
this sample, now on average 5 to 7 years old, still do not qualify for inclusion
in samples such as that of Kazanjian & Drazin [8], limited to surviving
companies with tangible products. A comprehensive "stages of growth" model
of technology-based companies must take into account the large number of
firms that never evolve into product manufacture and sales.
Supporting evidence for the first hypothesis is found in several other
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independent studies performed by the author. In an unpublished study of
nineteen computer-related firms, principal changes occurred over time in the
two firms initially doing consulting and the two others initially performing
only contract R&D. In that sample the number of firms involved with
computer hardware and/or software production, alone or in combination with
contract R&D work, grew from 79 percent at their foundings to 100 percent
by the time of data collection. Comparable transitions occurred in our
separate sample of 26 biomedical companies. The two medical companies
that started in sales and distribution only, plus the four that initially
performed R&D and consulting work exclusively, moved into integrated
operations covering the spectrum from R&D to manufacturing and sales,
joining eleven other companies that started in that integrated mode. Nine of
the biomedical firms maintained development ardor production focus
throughout their lives, not undertaking any sales efforts, a pattern not
unusual in the medical field where many smaller companies license or
distribute their products entirely through other much larger corporations.
And again in a cluster of 18 recently formed technological companies R&D
contractors went from 4 initially to only 1 six years later, while consultants
went from 3 to 1. In contrast, among the 23 spinoffs from the large
diversified technological firm we studied, several who were initially engaged
at least in part in production dropped their hardware activities after
encountering major problems in developing or selling products. For them a
shift to consulting was undertaken in order to survive. These are among the
only companies in all our entrepreneurship studies who "regressed" in the
product-focused evolutionary pattern.
The many company changes in these several samples from original work
in contract R&D or consulting indicate that much of this had been done merely
"to get things going". For example, within the overall sample described in
this article, 9 of the 15 firms that left the MIT Instrumentation Lab and
started as consultants claimed that they intended this consulting activity to
be transitional only. For a few firms, however, these areas still remain as
the desired work. Several of the entrepreneurs have no inclination to expand
beyond their consulting work which provides for them substantial personal
income even if their organizational size remains small. (This is consistent
with the finding in our earlier research that not all entrepreneurs have high
need-for-achievement. [14] Unfortunately we do not have sufficient data to
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test whether the individual entrepreneurs motivational characteristics
relate to the type of business he pursues.) On the other hand, contractual R&D
work is not necessarily done just "to get by" or to maintain independence. One
firm in our sample, remaining entirely in the R&D contracting business, has
already achieved significant sales and is growing rapidly. But a number of
founders of the seventeen companies that are still doing only R&D or
consulting are genuinely frustrated. They had hoped initially to find or
develop a product and transition into a manufacturing firm but they have been
unable to make the change; some still assert they will shift their businesses
in the future.
MICROSCOPIC CHANGE: THE FOUNDERS' ACTIVITIES, TIME
ALLOCATION, AND ORIENTATION
Turning to the second hypothesis, our assumption is that most
technically-based companies start with technology uppermost in their minds
and time commitments. But we presume that many entrepreneurs evolve
toward more market-oriented perspectives and activities. The smaller but
more detailed sub-sample (18 firms) was assembled to permit analysis of
founder time allocation and activities that can evidence evolution of
market-orientation, the two periods of sampling being the first six months of
the company and eighteen months later, the end of year two. Except where
specified, this smaller sub-sample is the source of data used in this section.
The First Six Months
Time Allocation. Aldrich & Auster [1] note that young companies suffer "the
consequences and strategic implications of two variables which affect
metamorphosis -- age and size." How technical companies begin to adapt to
these variables is evidenced in Table 3, displaying for the four major
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
operational areas the average percent efforts by company founders during the
first six months of existence of the eighteen technical firms in the
sub-sample. About 30% of their total working time was spent in engineering
efforts, with a similar proportion in sales and marketing efforts.
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Twenty-five percent was devoted to manufacturing while the least
percentage of time was used in financial and administrative activities. The
variations among the firms in these functional allocations are discussed
below.
The only companies spending more than 50% of their time in engineering
both produced custom products. In contrast two of the three firms with no
engineering activities supplied services while the third was selling a fully
developed standard product. Three firms spent no time in manufacturing. One
of these was still developing its product. Another had a product which was
engineered for special uses. The third firm was solely involved in supplying
programming services and classified none of its efforts as manufacturing.
Among the 18 firms providing detailed time allocation data there were no
relevant statistical associations of manufacturing efforts with other
variables, product manufacture being treated in the embryonic firm as largely
an end result of all other activities.
Similar variation occurs in the sales and marketing time allocations.
Only one firm did not spend any time on sales during its first six months.
That company devoted its entire first year to developing a marketable
product. Two other firms spent less than 10% of their founder time in
sales/marketing; both made custom products.
The amount of initial capital correlates significantly with the early
time allocation to financial and administrative activities (p=.02). Perhaps
more money requires more time to manage money, or technical entrepreneurs
might just assume increasing financial responsibility as the funds dictate. It
is not difficult to discover why several firms did not spend any time in this
area. Four of the five firms with zero finance time had initial financing of
only one thousand dollars, with the fifth firm being unwilling to reveal its
initial financing!
The monitoring of founder efforts during the first six months included
an attempt to identify the extent to which they were aware of their
competition, one aspect of market-orientation. This seems so obvious that
some may be surprised to know that entrepreneurs frequently claim they have
no competitors, their own products or services being so unique in their own
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opinion that no one else's outputs are relevant. These entrepreneurs
sometimes discover, too late, that other firms are offering similar
capabilities to the marketplace. Being aware of competitors should help to
shape the course of entrepreneurial efforts, as indeed is shown simply in
Table 4. Here we split the small sample into two clusters based on our
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
measure of competitor awareness and display the mean percentage efforts for
each group. Those who are aware of their competition reveal a more balanced
effort allocation across the operational areas, even during the first few
months of the firm's existence, with about twice the orientation toward sales
and marketing (at the expense of engineering and manufacturing), the primary
prospective sources of still further insights to customers and competitors.
Sales and Marketing. The backup details on the early sales and marketing
function are enlightening. This area of activity includes determining the
existence and needs of a particular market, sales and distribution within this
market, customer service, advertising and promotion. In a large company each
of these activities is generally performed by a different individual or group
who in turn reports to a Director of Marketing. These same functions must be
accomplished somehow in the small firm, albeit with considerably less
available manpower, and therefore by allocation of scarce time, especially
initially. Our data here show that the percentage effort devoted to sales
correlates negatively with the percent of customer contact made to take
orders (p=. 13), but strongly positively with the percent of customer contacts
made to determine customer needs (p=.09) and to estimate market potential
(p=.07). To some firms the sales/marketing function was narrowly
proscribed, just the direct selling of the product. The more this order-taking
perspective applied, the less was the time allocated overall to sales and
marketing efforts. The more the firm viewed sales and marketing as a
mechanism to observe and use market information, the greater the proportion
of founder time devoted to this function. For example, some unusual founders
believe that how customers might use their products is critical to eventual
company success. They therefore spend lots of time visiting prospects to
increase their own understanding. The presumed result is increased visibility
of the total market by the company's leadership, with attendant impact on
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such issues as product targeting, design, selling approach, and accompanying
service.
Fifty percent of the enterprises relied solely on direct contact by a
founder to sell to its customers. While this is self-limiting it also seems
beneficial in several ways. In the new technology-oriented firm the founding
entrepreneur is very possibly in the best position to explain the virtues of his
company's product to customers. In general he is not selling a standard
product which the customer needs to rn his operation, but rather one the
entrepreneur strongly advocates for improving the customer's operation.
Perhaps more important is that direct contact of a founder with a potential
customer is an excellent means for synthesizing product ideas with market
needs. One downside consequence is that the entrepreneur frequently
responds to specific customer issues by redesigning his product on the spot,
adding special features, and becoming a multi-product custom-oriented firm
before he has given his intended standard line a chance to sell.
The numerous means of selling other than direct contact were almost
nonexistent during this earliest period of company life. For instance, only
three of the eighteen companies used a sales force and only two others used
outside sales representatives. As we shall soon see, when the companies
gradually begin ironing out their startup difficulties their selling practices
shift significantly.
The high incidence of diract contact selling by a founder (occurring in
whole or in part initially in 96 of 109 companies in the overall sample)
definitely reflected both the newness of the firms and their small size, the
"liabilities" mentioned earlier by Aldrich & Auster [1]. But personal contact
was not necessarily an ineffectual way to proceed. Indeed the personal
representations of a founder to a potential customer were frequently
perceived as the primary reason a project or product were sold. Of more than
incidental note is the fact that the sales methods used did not vary
significantly across the several different types of business initially
undertaken, nor were there perceived differences in effectiveness of these
approaches as a function of any other company characteristics.
It seems interesting to note these entrepreneurs' identification of the
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primary source of new product ideas during their first six months. One
entrepreneur answered, "From the V.P.'s brain", communicating what I too
often find to be the case in technical enterprises, the presumption that the
uniqueness of a single person's ideas will suffice to generate product
innovation and corporate growth. Research studies over the past twenty
years [reviewed in 20] have demonstrated far higher success for products that
are responsive to "market pull" rather than "technology push". In many
industries some customers go beyond "demanding" a new product and actually
create products to meet their own needs; following this pathway can become
the most assured means to achieving successful innovation for the responsive
producer. [22]
Numerous companies in our data samples, founded by technologically
sophisticated entrepreneurs, "presumed" market needs based on their own
prejudices or "feel" rather than on probes of potential customers. Due to the
high technical competence of most of these entrepreneurs, and the high regard
in which they are often held in their particular technological field, such a
"feel" is often a legitimate and sufficient basis for producing and selling a
product or service. Too frequently, however, despite our lack of quantitative
evidence to support this charge, it seems that the engineer part of the
entrepreneur overrules his as yet underdeveloped business sense, and a
product is produced because it is technically appealing. Unfortunately no
market may exist for this ingenious bit of engineering wizardry. The classic
miscalculation of market "need" (and a stereotyped one) was the firm in the
first study that decided to produce a circuit because it was a "cute"
engineering design. When the company tried to sell it, it found dozens of
competitors making similar circuits and few customers with a need for it.
Another misperception was an MIT spinoff firm that made a small and
inexpensive transistor tester to replace a popular unit costing several times
as much. No sales resulted. "Everyone buys the expensive system", the
entrepreneur decried. His market, the defense industry, was far more
concerned with versatility than with price.
Table 5 shows the primary idea sources identified by the sub-sample
companies. Those noting previous job requirements as a product idea source
are indicating one form of sensing of market need. One example from the
overall sample, Ken Olsen, the founder of DEC, started his company by
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producing high-speed transistorized circuit modules that he said he could
have used in his MIT Lincoln Lab computer development projects. The table
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
suggests about a 50-50 split between external, i.e. market, "sourcing" of
product ideas and internal, i.e. founders, sources. Later in our overall
research program the possible ties between product sources and new company
success will be assessed. [15]
In partial confirmation of the second hypothesis, note the variety of
measures that indicate relative lack of market-orientation by the typical
technological entrepreneur at the time of company founding. The dominant
time allocation to engineering and the lack of formal marketing and sales
organizations reflect this condition. Yet clearly some founders are more
sensitive than their counterparts, aware of their competition, placing more
investment in the marketing function, using market contacts from the outset
of their companies to assess customer needs and develop new products based
on customer inputs.
The Next Eighteen Months
Sales and Marketing. By the end of year two of existence fifteen of the
eighteen companies studied in detail had a sales force (up from three during
the first six months), used either alone or in combination with other methods,
to sell to their customers. The number of potential customers contacted per
week by these sales forces ranged from one to forty, with a surprisingly low
median of three customer contacts per week. Although this small number
might reflect a high concentration of customers, we lack sufficient data to
test this possible explanation. This contact number did increase as a function
of the company's concentration upon the industrial market (p=.077),
government or consumer orientations apparently tending to demand fewer
direct selling contacts.
Sales representatives were also used increasingly as the new
enterprises developed during the next eighteen months, nine firms employing
them both to contact potential customers and to distribute the company's
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products and one company using reps just for distribution purposes. Five
other methods of selling were used in varying degree by the firms, including
mailing lists, new product "releases", attendance at technical shows,
authoring of technical articles, and magazine advertisements. In addition
those companies oriented primarily to government markets responded to
formal government Requests for Proposals or Quotations and also submitted
unsolicited proposals to various agencies. All these methods tend to reflect
the selling of a product's technical content or performance, an attribute
usually associated with the industrial anrd governmental markets that were
the dominant customers of the firms studied. The low use of magazine
advertising is consistent with the lack of consumer products.
As the company develops, its understanding and use of various aspects
of customer contact also changes. Contacts can be divided into three
categories: selling, servicing and researching. Selling includes both direct
sales efforts and taking orders. Servicing covers discussing technical or
delivery problems and procuring product specifications. Researching involves
evaluating competition, determining customer needs, finding other possible
customers and estimating market potential. Table 6 shows the average
percentage contacts in each of these categories as computed from the data
collected from all eighteen companies.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Only by knowing the needs of the market can an enterprise develop
highly saleable items. By knowing its potential market size the management
can better decide if undertaking a development program is worthwhile.
Equally important, the market is a haven for suggestions for new products.
Yet technical entrepreneurs often do not particularly appreciate these
perspectives. Those teams with prior experience in marketing operations
best understood the need to research the market and not just sell to it. Years
of prior founder experience in sales correlated closely with the time
allocated toward contacts made to estimate market potential (p=.065) as
well as with contacts made to determine customer needs (p=.047), but
negatively with contacts made solely for selling. (p=.082) Interestingly this
focus on getting insights from the customer, rather than just selling to the
customer, was strongest for those firms that served the defense market.
22
Close statistical associations were found between the overall percentage
contacts with the military market and the percent of customer contacts made
to determine customer needs (p=.006) as well as the percent contacts made to
estimate market potential. (p=.082) Perhaps those technical entrepreneurs
trying to sell to the military are more willing to accept that customer's
demands as "givens" which need to be uncovered, rather than assuming that
the market will beat a path to the door of "brilliant" entrepreneurial ideas.
Evolved Operations
Turning back now to the overall sample we can assess the extent of
further evolution of company operations as the firms reach an average age of
five to seven years. As a baseline a study of Michigan technical entrepreneurs
provides some details that suggest possible implications of the shifts that
occur in business type, as shown earlier in Table 2, upon the founders' time
allocations. Braden [2] divided 69 firms, which were on average eight years
old, into standard products/services, custom products/services, and
R&D/consulting. The percentile distribution of founder time differed
substantially among these three different business types: (a)
engineering/R&D--16.3, 23.2 and 47.3 percent, respectively; and (b)
marketing--20.1, 17.4, and 16.7 percent, respectively. To the extent that the
Michigan cross-sectional data can be applied to changes over time in our
sample, the founders in our sample might have been expected similarly to
shift their time allocation heavily away from engineering/R&D and to
somewhat increase their marketing percentage as the mix of their business
activities shifted over time from R&D/consulting to custom products to
standard products. Our founders would also have been expected to increase
their attention to production and finance activities as their mix of business
types changed.
Sales and Marketing. The sales methods employed by the technological firms
at their later stage of evolution remain heavily dependent on the founders.
Forty-two percent of the MIT spinoff firms still use only the founders for
selling contacts, but nineteen percent have added sales reps and nine percent
utilize a sales force as founder supplements. The other thirty percent of the
companies split between sales representatives and the company sales force,




products of a number of companies, usually small ones, for hopefully efficient
and complementary presentation to prospective customers. This "shared
sales force" is seldom seen by the entrepreneur as the most effective means
of achieving a significant penetration of the market but rather is regarded as
a "necessary evil". A broad product line and some level of achieved sales are
usually perceived as necessary economically for a firm to afford its own
direct sales force. The increase of direct sales forces is therefore an
indication of both growth and transformation of the firms. Initially only nine
companies in the first study had sales forces; now thirty-two have their own
sales forces. The sales methods used do not vary greatly among the different
types of businesses.
About thirty percent of the enterprises studied have still not used any
means to advertise or promote their work. For those that do advertise the
methods characterize the technical nature of the work being done, including
direct mail, trade shows, trade advertising, product releases or combinations
of these four. None of the statistics on promotional approaches used relates
significantly to any other major variable associated with these technological
enterprises.
Although existence of a formal marketing department is neither
necessary nor sufficient for establishing a marketing-orientation in a
technological firm, its use here as an index of organizational evolution seems
reasonable. Only forty-six percent of the 110 responding companies in the
sample have created marketing departments, apparently in all types of
businesses. Sixty percent of the 110 firms do sales forecasting, primarily
those engaged in hardware production. Formal sales forecasts are generated
by eighty-five percent of the firms doing solely hardware production, sixty
percent of those doing hardware plus contract R&D, fifty percent of those
producing both hardware and software products, and eighty percent of the
companies engaged in contract R&D along with both hardware and software
production. Only twenty percent of the companies without any hardware
production do sales forecasting. Thirty-five percent of the firms carry out
analyses of market potential, again done primarily by hardware producing
firms.
Our data do not indicate the exact timing of establishment of the
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specific marketing related operations just described: the existence of a
marketing department, the development of sales forecasts, and the
performance of market analyses. Some of these conceivably may have begun
at the very outset of the firm; others were no doubt established later as the
firms evolved.
The data analyses at the three time periods -- founding, year 2, and
years 5 to 7 -- provide strong confirmation of the second hypothesis. A small
percentage of technological enterprises begin with an orientation toward
their markets and toward serving their customers' needs. But many of the
companies gradually evolve in this direction, manifesting their shift in both
time allocation and formal market-related activities. Clearly not all
technical entrepreneurs have made this transformation by the latest time
studied, five to seven years post-founding. Some may change at a still later
time in their company lives but skepticism on this issue seems reasonable.
This evolution toward a market orientation "split" among technically-trained
entrepreneurs seems to have held over several decades of new company
formations: A similar 40 percent of our most recent separate sample of new
computer-oriented firms have also developed marketing departments at some
point in time after they were founded, moving away from initial 100%
dependence upon one or more of the founders. The cluster of spinoff
companies that originated in the large electronic systems firm we had
examined independently also includes fifty percent with marketing
departments, the slightly higher ratio perhaps reflecting a benefit of their
industrial experience.
EFFECTS OF MULTIPLE FOUNDERS
The third hypothesis asserts that larger-size founder groups reflect
stronger product and market focus at the outset of their companies and evolve
more rapidly in these dimensions. Both the overall sample and the more
detailed time data from the sub-sample help test this hypothesis.
Smaller founding teams which therefore have available and work fewer
total hours are constrained by the requirements of engineering. Being a
necessary part of initiating a product-producing technological enterprise,




time. If the founding group is larger, the entrepreneurs can fulfill the
requisite engineering activities and still have some time remaining for filling
the other "buckets", therefore ending up devoting an increasing portion of
their time to contacting the market. The actual hours spent in engineering
are not diminished, but the proportion of their time spent on engineering is.
Statistical findings from the detailed sub-sample are in accord with this
explanation. Total founder hours worked correlate positively with the number
of hours spent on engineering efforts (p=.1 3) but are negatively associated
with the percent of time on engineering (p=.08).
As the size of the founding team increases greater proportions of their
time are spent in efforts to sell the company's products. (p=.04) Another
measure of the same phenomenon is that total founder hours worked per week
correlates positively with percentage time spent on sales (p=.018). This
presumably draws upon the increased years of prior sales experience
encountered within the larger founding teams. (p=.004)
Data from the overall sample confirm and amplify the findings from the
smaller but deeper analysis presented above. In particular the advantage of
multiple founders is evidenced in several characteristics of business
operations, even during the early months. For example, none of 43 single
founder companies initially had a sales force. Ninety percent of them relied
upon the founder to do the selling, with the remainder depending upon sales
representatives alone or in conjunction with the founder. Nine of the
multi-founder companies set up sales forces immediately and 30% were able
to use selling methods other than personal contact by a founder. The single
founder has to sell along with performing all his other tasks. In many
multiple founder companies, the sales/marketing task was the responsibility
of one (or occasionally several) of the founders who devoted his principal
time to that job, reflecting a natural division of labor.
The figures in Table 7 from the overall sample do demonstrate that the
carrying out of these market-oriented operations is strongly associated with
the number of company co-founders. Thirty-five percent of the companies
founded by one person versus fifty percent of the multi-founder firms set up
marketing departments; 41% of sole entrepreneur firms did sales forecasts in
contrast with 70% of the multiple entrepreneur companies; and market
III
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analyses were performed by only 26% of the enterprises founded by one
person as opposed to 41% of the other firms. Teams of founders obviously can
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
undertake more tasks in parallel than a single founder, which indeed may well
have motivated the establishment of many of the multiple founder groups. The
detailed sub-sample data showed above the shift of founder time allocation
toward sales and marketing as the size of the founding group increased. Table
7 supports the perspective that when limited by available human resources
the technical entrepreneur gives priority to the technical aspects of the
business with which he is most familiar, and the development of a marketing
organization and its related activities may be delayed by default. The
evidence strongly confirms the third hypothesis on the positive impacts of
multiple founders.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Primary changes occur in technology-based companies during their first
several years of existence. Those documented in this article relate
principally to the firms' orientation to product-based businesses and to
marketing and selling activities within them. In support of our first general
hypothesis, the sample of 114 MIT spinoff companies went from 62 percent
initially engaged in development and sales of their own products to 84
percent over the course of the first few years, the bulk of change coming
from a number of companies departing from or supplementing initial focus
upon consulting or contract research and development work. At least those
changing firms have shifted from engineering and technology as their almost
total initial involvement toward some mix of product and market orientation.
These early years also witness increased formal commitment by the
entrepreneurial founders to marketing and sales activities, as predicted by
our second general hypothesis. Evidences include a reduction in the number of
firms that are solely dependent upon their founders for direct customer
contact, paralleled by a dramatic increase in direct sales forces and even
larger growth in the use of sales representatives. Awareness of competition
is a strong influence on company orientation, with those sensitive to
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competitive environments placing far more effort in the direction of
marketing activities. Evolution of these technological firms, however, leads
to still less than half with their own marketing departments, even after five
to seven years of company growth and development.
In support of our third general hypothesis, companies founded by more
than one entrepreneur devote a larger proportion of their efforts to marketing
and sales even from the outset, with less effort going into engineering. This
tendency relates in part to the increased presence of prior sales and
marketing experience in the backgrounds of multi-founder teams. The
multi-founder firms more quickly employ sales forces than single founder
firms, and also are more likely to develop marketing departments, carry out
sales forecasts, and perform analyses of potential markets.
The author hypothesized in Figure 1 a partial causal model of growth
and success of the technology-based firm. While key elements of it await
further verification, its structure highlights the likely dependency of success
upon both product and market-orientation. Entrepreneurs and investors who
accept the plausibility of that model should note from our analyses that most
firms which started without product either are slow to evolve or never get to
production status. Half the companies that originate without a product at
least in development stage never make the conversion into manufacturing.
Similarly, lack of market-orientation at the outset is frequently not
corrected merely by the passing of time, with formal market-related
activities still missing from the majority of technology-based enterprises
even after several years of company existence.
Both entrepreneurs and investors also need to recognize the more
balanced and accelerated approach to company development that is typically
undertaken by the multi-founder firm, which initially targets an explicit
product market. Single founder firms are especially slow in developing
formal sales and marketing approaches that go beyond their own personal
skills and effort, thereby retarding the firm's evolution. Including sales and
marketing skills in the initial founding group seems especially appropriate.
Confirmation of the possible relations of these variables to eventual success
and failure of the technology-based firm will have to await further analyses.
[15] But in the meantime prospective entrepreneurs should strongly consider
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taking the rather low "risk" of adopting a product/market-oriented team
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Table 1. Data Sources for Study of Product and Market Evolution
within New Technological Enterprises*
New Companies Participants in
Sources of New Enterprises Identified Research Study
MIT major laboratories (4) 107 96
MIT academic department (1) 18 18
Totals 125 114
* Among my many former research assistants and thesis students who
contributed importantly to the data and analyses contained within this article
were Howard A. Cohen and S. William Linko, Jr., as well as my former research
associate Herbert A. Wainer.
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Table 2. Business Orientation of Technology-Based Firms:
Changes from Founding
Tvoe of Business-Later Type of Business - Beginning
Prod. Prod. Prod. Prod.-H Prod.-S Prod.-H&S Ctrct
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6 21 20 109Beginning Totals
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Table 3. Effort Allocation by Founders During First Six Months (n=18)





























































































































* Mann-Whitney U significance levels, indicating the strong association of
each of the three characteristics of marketing operations with multiple
founders.
